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FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR
ENGLAND AND WALES
Professor Lissa Griffin
Pace Law School, Pace University
ABSTRACT
The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal has extensively analyzed the role
of forensic evidence. In doing so, the court has grappled with the admissibility
and reliability of a broad range of forensic evidence, from DNA and computer
forensics to medical and psychological proof, to more outlying subjects like facial
mapping, fiber analysis, or voice identification. The court has analyzed these sub-
jects from two perspectives: the admissibility of such evidence in the lower courts
and the admissibility of such evidence as fresh evidence on appeal. In both con-
texts, the court has taken a practical approach to admitting forensic proof that is
deemed to be helpful and reliable. It has also given helpful guidance to practi-
tioners dealing with these issues, and to judges who must instruct juries about
how to evaluate forensic evidence. Compared to the approach of the United
States courts, the Court of Appeal has indicated a greater willingness to keep pace
with scientific developments and to admit forensic proof that contributes to the
accuracy of criminal verdicts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales (“the
court”) has had an extensive relationship with forensic evidence in criminal cases.
Its history of grappling with many forms of forensic evidence is broad and de-
tailed: throughout the years, the court has explored the admissibility and relia-
bility of DNA evidence, medical evidence, and psychological evidence as well as
computer forensic testimony, fingerprinting, facial mapping, and other types of
forensic proof.1
The court has addressed this kind of evidence through two vehicles: (1) by
reviewing the treatment of those issues in trial courts;2 and (2) by way of its power
to receive fresh evidence – forensic or otherwise - on appeal.3 As to the first ap-
proach, the court has written extensively on the admissibility of forensic evidence
at trial. Specifically, the court has analyzed the questions of when convictions
based on forensic evidence are unsafe and what is required of the prosecution
and defense when offering or contesting forensic proof at trial and on appeal. As
to the second approach, the court has discussed when fresh forensic evidence
should be received on appeal, and how to treat new scientific developments. In
its analysis, the court has been assisted greatly by specific protocols established
*Professor of Law, Pace Law School. Contact: lgriffin@law.pace.edu
1 See generally R. v. Coats, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1472 (psychological); R. v. Hall, [2011] EWCA
(Crim) 4 (fiber); R. v. Smith, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1296, [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. 16 (fingerprint);
R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24
(medical); R. v. Inglis, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2637 (psychological); R. v. O’Shea, [2010] EWCA
(Crim) 2879 (document and computer); R. v. Reed & Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [2010]
1 Cr. App. R. 23 (DNA); R. v. Atkins & Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [2010] 1 Cr. App.
R. 8 (facial mapping); R. v. JRH, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1828, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 10
(psychological); R. v. Kai-Whitewind, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1092, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 31
(medical); R. v. Otoo, No. 9906358/Y3, ¶¶ 26, 39 (C.A. Jan. 31 2005) (on file with author)
(DNA); R. v. Cannings, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1, [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 7 (medical); R. v. Shirley,
[2003] EWCA (Crim) 1976 (DNA); R. v. O’Doherty, [2002] NICA (Crim) B51; [2002] N.I. 263
(voice identification).
2 See discussion infra Parts II-III.
3 The court itself has referred to seminal cases in this context such as R. v. Jones, [1997] 1 Cr.
App. R. 86; R. v. Kai-Whitewind, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1092, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 31; R. v.
Meachen, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1701; and R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA
(Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
Forensic Evidence and the Court of Appeal for England and Wales
621
by the forensic science community, the Forensic Science Regulator,4 and by Par-
liament.5
Part II of this chapter addresses the general standards for admissibility of
forensic evidence in the Court of Appeal. Part III analyzes how the general stand-
ards outlined in Part II have been applied to various types of forensic evidence,
including DNA, medical evidence, psychological evidence, fingerprints, computer
evidence, and other less conventional evidence such as fibers, voice, and facial
mapping evidence. The chapter concludes with some general observations about
the willingness to receive relevant forensic proof and the substantial guidance the
court has given to practitioners seeking to introduce such proof in that court.
II. GENERAL STANDARDS
A. ADMISSIBILITY
Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules provides the standard for admissi-
bility of any kind of expert forensic evidence.6 The standard must be satisfied
before expert testimony is received at trial or on appeal. In R. v. Reed & Anor,7
the court the court summarized the kinds of evidence that could be admissible
under the rules as follows:
a. Expert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the scientific
bases on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable for it to be put
before the jury.
b. Even if the scientific basis is sufficiently reliable, the evidence is not ad-
missible unless it is within the scope of evidence an expert can properly
give.
c. Unless the admissibility is challenged, the judge will receive that evidence.
If objection is made, the party proffering the evidence must prove its ad-
missibility.
Applying these standards, the court held that forensic trial proof should not
have been received where its alleged scientific basis is not sufficiently reliable.8
4 The Forensic Science Regulator ensures that the United Kingdom’s forensic science service
providers comply with the appropriate scientific quality standards. The Forensic Science
Regulator is responsible for establishing scientific quality standards and for guiding forensic
science service providers to comply with those standards. Forensic Service Regulator, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about (last visited
Aug. 16, 2014).
5 Specifically, Parliament addressed the use of forensic evidence in court through the presentment
of expert witnesses. See Criminal Procedure Rules, 2013, Part 33, available at
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2012/crim-proc-rules-2013-
part-33.pdf.
6 Criminal Procedure Rules, 2013, Part 33, available at
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2012/crim-proc-rules-2013-
part-33.pdf.
7 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23 at ¶¶ 111-13.
8 Id. ¶114.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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This can be a very multi-faceted and complex issue. In more controversial areas,
the court’s analysis might deal with whether the claimed scientific basis is recog-
nized by experts in the field or whether there is even a scientific basis for the
expert’s conclusions (for example, shaken baby syndrome deaths,9 auditory anal-
ysis,10 and explosives testing.)11 In more traditional forensic areas, such as DNA
evidence, the court might address whether the statistical evidence is reliable;
where there is no statistical evidence, the court will need to determine whether
an expert’s “evaluative” opinion, based on his or her experience and expertise, is
sufficiently reliable to be admissible.12
B. FRESH EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
More often, the Court of Appeal addresses evidentiary issues that arise when
fresh forensic evidence is offered on appeal.13 In addition to satisfying the stand-
ard for admissibility of expert forensic evidence, the fresh evidence offered on
appeal must satisfy Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.14 That statute
requires the Court of Appeal to receive fresh evidence where:
(1) the "evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief";
(2) it appears to the Court that the evidence "may afford any ground for allow-
ing the appeal";
(3) "the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the
appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal"; and
(4) "there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in
those proceedings.”15
In addition to its mandatory receipt of fresh evidence, the court may use its
discretion to receive new evidence when it is "expedient in the interests of justice"
to do so.16 Under this standard, fresh evidence will be received when it is “new
and compelling.”17
9 R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24; R.
v. Bacchus, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1756.
10 R. v. O’Doherty, [2002] NICA (Crim) B51; [2002] N.I. 263.
11 R. v. Assali, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2031.
12See R. v. Dlugosz, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 2.
13 This procedural step is the equivalent of receiving newly discovered evidence in the United
States courts. In the United States, however, appellate courts do not receive any evidence; if newly
discovered evidence is to be considered, the proceeding must take place in the trial court in which
a conviction was previously entered, and often before the same judge who presided at the earlier
trial.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968, § 23, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/19/section/23#commentary-c1424586.
15 Id. § 23 ¶ 2(a)-(d).
16 Id. §23 ¶ 1. See, e.g., R. v. Hall, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 4; R. v. O’Shea, [2010] EWCA (Crim)
2879.
17 R. v. O’Shea, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2879. Courts have admitted “new and compelling”
evidence when the fresh evidence is sufficient to render the conviction unsafe. To determine the
safety of a conviction, courts have looked at several factors, including the strength of the proof
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Aside from the general questions of admissibility that arise from the Crimi-
nal Procedure Rules, Court of Appeal decisions involving fresh forensic evidence
frequently examine two other questions: (1) if the issue is whether the evidence
should be received, the court examines whether there is good reason why the
evidence was not presented before; and (2) if the issue is whether the new evi-
dence renders the conviction unsafe, the court examines whether the evidence is
sufficiently significant to have had an impact on the verdict under the Court of
Appeal’s Pendleton standard. – i.e., whether new evidence “might reasonably
have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict.”18 The first inquiry goes to
the question of whether the evidence should be received, and the second question
goes to whether, if it is received, the conviction should be quashed. In fact, as a
practical matter, the two issues work together: the court is unlikely to find that
proffered fresh evidence supports any ground for allowing the appeal if that evi-
dence is not significant enough to render the verdict unsafe.19
In some cases, the court has directly addressed whether fresh forensic evi-
dence should be received. Interestingly, however, these cases are the rarest. In-
stead, in many cases the court will receive fresh evidence de bene esse and proceed
directly to the question of whether the evidence would render the conviction un-
safe.20 Accordingly, the issue of receipt is not initially addressed: if the court con-
cludes the conviction is unsafe, it will then receive the fresh evidence.21 In some
other cases, the issue of receipt is not addressed because the prosecution has con-
ceded that the fresh evidence should be received and considered.22 The prosecu-
tion’s argument in those cases is that the evidence, although admissible on appeal,
is not significant enough to render the conviction unsafe.23
It is clear that fresh forensic evidence will not be received if it was available
at trial, regardless of whether it was used or not.24 If it was used at trial and the
itself, the issues at trial, the existence or strength of other evidence supporting the verdict, and the
accuracy and clarity of jury directions about how to evaluate the reliability of the evidence,
whether to accept it, and how to use it. See, e.g., R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010]
EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24; R. v. O’Shea, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2879; R. v.
Boreman & Ors., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2265; R. v. Reed & Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698;
R. v. Clark, [2000] EWCA (Crim) 54.
18 R. v. Pendleton, [2000] EWCA (Crim) 45, [19].
19 See, e.g., R. v. Kai-Whitewind, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1092, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 31. This
conclusion is quite similar to the situation in the United States, where courts are generally
unwilling to admit so-called “newly discovered evidence.” Unless it would have had a substantial
likelihood of changing the verdict.
20 The court will receive fresh evidence de bene esse even when the fresh evidence is witness
testimony from witnesses in the same expertise as the witnesses previously available. See R. v.
Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24.
21 See, e.g., R. v. Cannings, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1, [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 7.
22 See, e.g., R. v. Pluck, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2936 (conceding that fresh DNA evidence ought
to be received); Hall v. R., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 4 (conceding that developments in fiber testing
are not available).
23 Id.
24 R. v. Reed & Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23 (finding that Reed’s
decision not to present forensic evidence that was available at trial did not affect the question of
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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fresh evidence is offered later, simply to contradict the original evidence, that
evidence will not be received.25 Essentially, contradictory evidence offered to re-
but and discredit the expert that testified at trial will not be received. 26 The same
principle precludes relief where the defendant obtained expert reports but chose
not to use them at trial.27
A significant number of cases before the Court of Appeal concern the ad-
mission of fresh forensic evidence that was not available at the time of trial but
that has subsequently become available due to scientific developments.28 In some
sense, these cases are easier for the court to resolve because they do not raise
questions of whether the evidence was available at the time of trial or why the
evidence was not prevented earlier. Since the Court of Appeal decides appeals
under the law that exists at the time of the appeal, not the law at the time of
trial,29 it tends to take a relatively lenient approach to at least considering new
scientific evidence even if it concludes that the conviction is not unsafe. Those
cases are extremely interesting and represent the court’s willingness to test old
convictions by the standards of modern science.
Whether a conviction will be held to be unsafe based on a finding that trial
evidence was inadmissible or based on the receipt of fresh evidence on appeal
turns on several factors. The court has grappled on a case-by-case basis with the
ultimate safety of a conviction and whether fresh evidence – considered de bene
esse or received – is sufficient to render a conviction unsafe. In evaluating these
cases, the court generally looks at the following factors: the experience and qual-
ifications of the experts (i.e., the strength of the proof itself); the issues at trial,
for example, whether the subject of scientific evidence was important; the exist-
ence or strength of other evidence supporting the verdict; and the accuracy and
clarity of jury directions about how to evaluate the reliability of the evidence,
whether to accept it, and how to use it.30
admissibility). In essence, Reed waived receipt of fresh forensic evidence by choosing not to
present it at trial when it was available.
25 See, e.g., R. v. Kai-Whitewind, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1092, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 31.
26As the court expressly noted, convictions will not be quashed in cases where a defendant is
repeating “evidence of the same effect by some other expert.” Id. ¶ 97.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App.
R. 24 (finding a new possible cause for the symptoms that scientists believed could only be caused
by shaken baby syndrome); R. v. Reed & Anor., [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1976 (addressing the
development of DNA evidence).
29 R. v. Shirley, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1976.
30See, e.g., R. v. Henderson, Butler and Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App.
R. 24; R. v. O’Shea, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2879; R. v. Boreman & Ors., [2006] EWCA (Crim)
2265; R. v. Reed & Anor.,[2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698; R. v. Clark, [2000] EWCA (Crim) 54.
Thus, for example, the court has held that clear and accurate jury directions are required when
forensic evidence is presented. Clear and accurate jury directions include, if relevant, directing
the jury that the science at issue is undeveloped. In addition, the jury should be told that the
possibility that evidence exists which would assist the accused or exculpate him does not provide
grounds for excluding relevant evidence. Rather the jury must evaluate the existing evidence
properly. See R. v. Bates, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1395 [¶30].
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Significantly, the Court of Appeal has made very clear what it expects from
counsel presenting or challenging expert evidence at trial: strict compliance with
Criminal Procedure Rules Part 33.31 The court did so in the context of expert
DNA evidence.32 In Henderson, Butler and Oyediran v. R., 33 the court also set
out the duties of appellate counsel in presenting new evidence.34 There, it praised
the efforts of counsel as follows:
All counsel we heard in these cases were able to assist due to their experience
in cases such as these and to the skill with which they deployed that experience.
It is no criticism of other counsel if we highlight the manner in which counsel
for the prosecution, Joanna Glynn QC and Sarah Campbell, and for the de-
fense, Mr[.] Topolski QC and Andrew Scott, in Henderson, prepared their ap-
peal. The skeleton arguments were focused upon the particular medical evi-
dence. Different features of that evidence were clearly identified and when any
medical proposition was advanced, it was explained and its source clearly iden-
tified. A number of different disciplines were involved, all of which were clearly
distinguished by separate files, separately colored and with the underlying evi-
dence and literature upon which that evidence was based, identified and col-
lated. A core literature file, prepared by Mr[.] Topolski, enabled the court to
find and weigh the underlying literature upon which controversial evidence was
based. The Vice-President conducted a detailed case management hearing
providing timetables and giving directions as to how the evidence was to be
prepared. Importantly, meetings were held between the experts so as to identify
clearly those issues upon which agreement had been reached and those issues
which remained a matter of debate. Without such preparation and obedience
to the directions given by the Vice-President it would have been difficult
properly to resolve the appeal. The example of the preparation in that case
should, we suggest, be followed in future appeals.35
31 Criminal Procedure Rules, 2013, Part 33, available at
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2012/crim-proc-rules-2013-
part-33.pdf.
32 “Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules …set[s] out the procedure through which the court
controls expert evidence in the developing science of DNA….Rule 33.3(1) [provides] a very
important safeguard. This requires at sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) each expert to identify where
there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in his report. In such a case, the expert must
summarise the scope of opinion and give reasons for his own opinion. If the expert cannot give
his opinion without qualification, he must state the qualification. Compliance with this obligation
will identify for the other party an area where there is a range of opinion; it is particularly
important that this rule is followed in the expert report obtained by the Crown.” R. v. Reed &
Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698 [¶ 129], [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23 [¶ 129].
33 [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24.
34 Id. ¶ 5 (noting, “Since the appeal depends upon an assessment of the expert evidence, just as at
trial, the preparation and marshalling of that expert evidence is of the utmost importance in
achieving just resolution. The appeal requires presentation by counsel experienced and expert in
the field of what is contended to be the unexplained death of or injury to a child. Such counsel
need to be able to identify focussed issues upon which this court can concentrate and to identify
the evidence, whether it be evidence at trial or which it is sought to call, on which resolution of
those issues will depend.”).
35 Id.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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Finally, as in all of its cases, the question of remedy in forensic evidence
cases is an independent issue for the Court of Appeal. Where fresh evidence ren-
ders a conviction unsafe, should there be a retrial or should the conviction simply
be quashed? As in other cases, the default remedy is to quash the conviction.36
However, the court also may order a retrial.37
III. TYPES OF FORENSIC PROOF
A discussion of how these general principles are applied in cases addressing
various types of evidence best demonstrates the court’s treatment of forensic ev-
idence. Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the Court of Appeal’s approach to
DNA, medical, psychological, fingerprint, and computer evidence, as well as less
traditional forms of forensic evidence such as fiber, voice and facial mapping
proof.
A. DNA
DNA presents the prototypical case in which the court has been asked to
receive fresh evidence that was unavailable at trial because the science had not
developed sufficiently at the time. In the 1980s, when DNA evidence was entirely
new, the court addressed the testing process, the interpretation of testing results,
the role of experts, and the directions given to juries.38 Analysis continued as the
science developed.39 Once DNA testing became an accepted area of forensic sci-
ence, new issues arose. In a case where DNA results were received in evidence at
trial, samples that had not been subject to testing were later proved to be testable.
Similarly, more discerning tests have been developed that contradict or add to
the evidence at trial. Thus, for example, in Shirley v. R.,40 the results of DNA
testing on a very small piece of material, which results had not been available at
trial due to the primitive development of DNA testing, were received in evidence
to show that the defendant could not have committed the rape for which he had
been convicted.41 Additionally, in R. v. Otoo,42 DNA evidence from a pair of
trainers that could not earlier have been successfully tested proved that the de-
fendant had not committed the charged robbery and corroborated the defend-
ant’s claim that he had been forced to trade trainers with the actual robber.
36 See, e.g., R. v. Shirley, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1976. See also R. v. Henderson, Butler and
Oyediran, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24.
37 See, e.g., R. v. Inglis, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2269; R. v. Friend, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2661.
38 See R. v. Doheny, [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 369.
39 R. v. Bates, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1395. For a primer on the basic science of DNA testing and
the history of the Court of Appeal’s treatment, see R. v. Reed & Anor., [2009] EWCA (Crim)
2698 [¶¶ 28-61], [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23 [¶¶ 28-61].
40 [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1976.
41 Id. ¶ 6 (“At the time of the offence and its investigation, the state of relevant scientific
knowledge and expertise did not allow effective DNA profiling from samples bearing such little
material as was to hand in this case; all that could sensibly be done was to test the recovered
semen for blood grouping….”).
42 No. 9906358/Y3, ¶¶ 26, 39 (C.A. Jan. 31 2005) (on file with author).
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One issue addressed by the court concerns the reliability of the various types
of DNA testing. In R. v. Reed & Anor.,43 the court summarized the history of its
treatment of DNA evidence based on low template DNA testing, (LCN DNA) an
older method, and received, de bene esse, fresh scientific evidence challenging the
reliability and evidential value of such test results.44 In that case, a challenge to
the reliability of that evidence was abandoned on appeal after a more sophisti-
cated test revealed the same results. 45 Nevertheless, the court took the oppor-
tunity to analyze the reliability of low template DNA evidence for future cases.46
Thus, the court explained that the amount of DNA available for testing must be
quantified before testing and that such evidence would henceforth be considered
as reliable if 100-200 picograms of genetic material were available for testing.47
In cases where there is a dispute about the size of the sample, the parties should
present expert evidence on the subject of whether a reliable interpretation can be
made “by persons who are expert in the science of DNA and supported by the
latest research on the subject.”48
The court has prescribed the jury directions that should be given where the
jury is required to evaluate DNA proof.49 In brief, where evidence of a probable
match is presented and contested, the judge must explain the relevance of the
alleged probability and the other evidence that gives the probability its probative
value and must “draw attention to any evidence which might exculpate the de-
fendant.”50
A significant issue is the admissibility and treatment of expert forensic testi-
mony about DNA where the expert’s opinion is not based on statistics but rather
on experience and expertise. This situation arises, for example, where there is
insufficient material fro reliable testing or where the issue is not identification but
method of transfer, discussed below. As discussed earlier in Part II, such “evalu-
ative” expert evidence generally will be admissible if the court concludes the ex-
perience and expertise upon which it is based is sufficient. Given the risk that the
jury will overestimate the strength of this evidence, however, the court must be
careful to instruct clearly about how to evaluate the reliability of such proof.51
43 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. Based on Prof. Caddy’s study and recommendations, which were accepted by the Forensic
Science Regulator, the jury should be informed of any Low Template DNA profile regardless of
the quantity of DNA. However, in such cases, the jury should be cautioned that the quantity of
DNA is unknown, the time of DNA transfer is unknown, and that the possibility of secondary
transfer here is more likely than in standard DNA profiling. Dr. Caddy further contends that DNA
profile matches due to LCN DNA profiling should be reported to the jury as a match only. The
source of DNA material or the activity through which it was transferred should not be mentioned.
Id. ¶¶ 115-16.
48 Id. ¶ 74(v).
49 Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
50 Id. ¶ 55.
51 See supra Part II, discussing R. v. Dlugosz [2013] EWCA (Crim) 2.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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A related issue, therefore, addressed by the court is the reliability of expert
testimony – often, again, based not on statistics here but on experience and ex-
pertise - as to the manner and time of DNA transfer – how and when did the
DNA get to be where it was found? This can be a critical issue at trial. In fact,
this was the main issue in R. v. Reed & Anor.,52 where the defendants, whose
DNA was found in the victim’s home, had claimed they had never been there.53
At trial, the prosecution’s expert testified that the most likely explanation for the
defendants’ DNA on the handles broken off of two knives that were found in the
house was that the defendants brought the knives there and were handling them
when they broke.54 The prosecution’s expert did not address other potential ex-
planations for the DNA on the knife handles such as an innocent primary touch-
ing of the knives or possible secondary touching, whereby the defendants touched
the hands of someone who then touched the knives. The defendants argued that
the expert testimony introduced by the prosecution went well beyond that which
was scientifically possible to explain, that it was not possible to scientifically
opine about how the cellular material got on the knife handles, and that the ex-
pert’s testimony constituted “a direction from an expert to convict.”55 The de-
fense further argued that the expert’s testimony regarding secondary transfer was
“unrealistic.”56 The defense presented its own experts. One defense expert testi-
fied that “no firm view could be expressed as to the time for which an object had
to be held for primary transfer to take place or the period of time that could
elapse between primary and secondary transfer.”57 Accordingly, a scientific opin-
ion could not be made as to the method of transfer.58 The second defense expert’s
supporting testimony was dismissed since his expertise in the interpretation of
DNA results was limited: “His expertise did not extend to examining the scene
of a crime and relating that examination to the evaluation of the circumstances
of transfer of unidentified cellular material.”59
The court concluded, first, that an opinion as to how the DNA was placed
on the material from which the DNA cellular material was taken is admissible
where the quantity of DNA is above 200 picograms.60 Second, the court ex-
plained that, although the science on transferability was incomplete and thus ar-
guably failed to satisfy the second prong of the Criminal Procedure Rules’ test,
which requires that the conclusion is within the expert’s competence, the under-
lying science was sufficiently reliable for a range of possibilities to be enumer-
ated.61 However, the court noted that a range of possibilities could only be enu-
merated if the limitations are made clear to the jury.62 The expert also can give
52 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23.
53 Id. ¶ 147.
54 Id. ¶¶ 87-90.
55 Id. ¶ 91.
56 Id. ¶ 92.
57 Id. ¶ 100(ii).
58 Id.
59 Id. ¶ 103.
60 Id. ¶ 118-19.
61 Id.¶ 119.
62 Id.
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an evaluation of those possibilities. The known mechanisms of primary and sec-
ondary transfer, the observations at the scene, and any other facts upon which
the opinion is based should be enumerated.63 The court warned, however, that
“care must be taken to guard against the dangers of that evaluation being tainted
with the verisimilitude of scientific certainty….”64 That was the case in Reed, and
the expert’s opinion that it came from knives brought in by the defendants was
admissible.65 However, the court explained that the expert’s testimony that the
defendants were handling the knives when the knives broke was improper be-
cause there was no reliable scientific basis to support it.66 However, since it was
not objected to and since the court concluded that it did not affect the jury’s
conclusion, the appeals were dismissed.67
The decision in R. v. Reed & Anor., concluded with an outline of the ap-
propriate pre-trial procedures to be undertaken in a case involving DNA evi-
dence. That procedure focuses primarily on Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure
Rules.68 Rule 33.3(1) provides, in relevant part, the following:
(1) An expert’s report must—
…(f) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the
report—
(i) summarize the range of opinion, and
(ii) give reasons for his own opinion;
(g) if the expert is not able to give his opinion without qualification,
state the qualification…69
The court explained that Rule 33.3(1) provides an important safeguard for
expert testimony involving DNA evidence,70 particularly subparagraphs (f) and
(g).71 According to the court, these subparagraphs require an expert to qualify
any opinion by providing a precise explanation of the opinion, a summary of the
scope of the opinion, and the reasons for the opinion.72
If parties have served expert reports on one another, each expert report must
be analyzed by each party.73 Any disagreements with the expert report must be
brought to the court’s attention.74 If the parties have not served expert reports,
63 Id. ¶ 120.
64 Id. ¶ 121.
65 Id. ¶ 122.
66 Id. ¶ 127.
67 Id. ¶ 123.
68 Id. ¶ 129.
69 Criminal Procedure Rules, 2013, Part 33, available at
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2012/crim-proc-rules-2013-
part-33.pdf.
70 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698 [¶ 129].
71 Id.
72 Id. ¶ 131.
73 Id. ¶ 131(i).
74 Id. ¶ 131(ii).
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the prosecution and defense must take necessary steps to ensure that any disa-
greements with the expert report are brought to the court’s attention.75
In addition, the court referred to Rule 33.6(2), which gives the court the
“power to direct experts to discuss expert issues in the proceedings and prepare
a statement for the court of the matters on which they agree and disagree giving
their reasons.”76 If the court does so, the experts should put forth a statement
that outlines the basic science that is agreed upon and that identifies precisely
what is in dispute.77 If the expert does not meet with the court or produce this
statement, the court will exercise discretion and may potentially decide to prevent
the party, whose expert was supposed to produce this statement, from calling
that expert to give evidence.78 Failure to meet with the court or produce a report
because the expert does not have time does not provide good cause to excuse the
Rule 33.6(2) requirement.79
B. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The court also has frequently addressed questions of the admissibility and
weight of expert medical testimony. Most often, the cases involve medical evi-
dence offered by the prosecution to establish cause of death or to support an
allegation of sexual abuse that otherwise is based only on a complainant’s alle-
gations. In such cases, the court generally focuses on the experience and special
training (clinical or academic) of the witness; the materials available to the wit-
ness and on which the witness bases his or her opinion (actual samples or not);
evidence - expert or otherwise - that confirms or supports that opinion; and the
clarity and accuracy of the directions of the judge concerning the jury’s evaluation
of that evidence. The two most frequently addressed issues are cause of death in
homicide cases and corroboration of allegations of sexual abuse.
i. Cause of Death
Several important aspects of the court’s handling of medical evidence derive
from cases involving the unexpected death of an infant, i.e., Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome (SIDS) and shaken baby syndrome cases.
The first case, R. v. Cannings,80 involved a battle between forensic experts
who disagreed about whether the infant’s death was from natural causes or from
trauma.81 The Court of Appeal quashed a conviction not, as it later explained,
because there was no way for the jury to reject or accept either position, but
75 Id. ¶ 131(iii).
76 Id. ¶ 130.
77 Id. ¶ 131(v).
78 Id. ¶ 131(vi).
79 Id. The court notes that this procedure will “identify whether the issue in dispute raises a
question of admissibility to be determined by the judge or whether the issue is one where the
dispute is simply one for determination by the jury.” Id. ¶ 132.
80 [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1, [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 7.
81 Id.
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because the only support for the allegation that the mother killed the child was
the coincidence of multiple, unexplained infant deaths in one family.82
In R. v. Kai-Whitewind,83 which built on language in the Cannings decision,
the defendant argued the conviction was unsafe for three reasons: (1) there was
a serious disagreement among experts about the cause of death; (2) experts had
concluded that natural causes cannot be excluded as a possible cause of death;
and (3) there was no additional evidence that supported the conclusion that the
child was harmed.84 The court rejected the contention that, in a case involving a
single death, a disagreement among experts is sufficient to render the conviction
unsafe.85
In Kai-Whitewind, the court also was asked to receive extensive allegedly
fresh evidence in support of the conclusion that the infant had died of natural
causes. The court received this evidence de bene esse, but then rejected it because
there was no explanation for why it had not been produced a trial86 and because
it did not add anything to the appellant’s argument..87
A major decision involving forensic medical evidence is that in Henderson,
Butler and Oyediran v. R.,88 the most recent set of shaken baby syndrome cases.
Each case involved an infant homicide based on allegations that an unexpected
infant death was caused by shaking.
82 Id. ¶ 175-79.
83 [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1092, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 31.
84 Id. ¶ 74.
85 Id. ¶ 89. The Kai-Whitewind court’s reliance on Cannings is misplaced. The Cannings court
explained that where the only support for a conclusion of unaccidental death is the coincidence
of other unexplained infant deaths in the family, the prosecution normally should not be brought.
The basis for the ruling in Cannings was not that there was a disagreement among experts that
the jury could not resolve, but that the only basis for the charge was coincidence. As in Kai-
Whitewind, where only one infant death is involved, a disagreement among experts does not
render the conviction unsafe.
86 The defense sought to call five expert medical witnesses whom were not produced at trial. Id.
¶ 94. The court dismissed defense’s request for two reasons. First, the defense was able to call
these five experts at trial and no explanation was provided for why these five experts were not
produced. Id. ¶ 95. Second, the evidence they would have produced was produced at trial by
another expert. Id. Accordingly, the witness would not add any “fresh” evidence. Id. Just because
an expert chosen by the defense did not give evidence during trial in a form agreeable to the
defense does not allow the defense to produce additional experts after trial. Id. ¶ 97.
87 During appeal, the defense sought to rely on three experts: Prof. Andrew Nicholson, Dr. Mark
Rosenthal. and Dr. Brendan MacDonald. Prof. Nicholson sought to provide evidence of a single
cluster of cells found on the slides containing sections of Bidzill’s lungs. Id. ¶ 98. Prof.
Nicholson’s evidence was no clinical significance, did not advance appellant’s case, and would
afford no ground for allowing the appeal. Id. Dr. Rosenthal sought to consider the fact that
appellant was diabetic and suffered from related health issues as a result. Id. ¶ 98. The court found
that Dr. Rosenthal provided no relevant evidence. Id. Dr. Rosenthal also sought to produce
evidence that the green vomit presented an unusual symptom. Id. ¶ 100. The court held that this
evidence would afford no ground for allowing the appeal. Id. ¶ 102. Dr. MacDonald sought to
present evidence that doubted Dr. Bonshek’s diagnosis of gliosis. Id. ¶ 103. Again, the court
found that Dr. MacDonald’s evidence would not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. Id. ¶
105.
88 [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1269, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 24.
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In the first case, Henderson, the prosecution’s trial expert testified that the
only possible cause of the infant’s death was trauma by shaking.89 The defense
presented expert evidence at trial to rebut that proof.90 After trial, a new possible
cause for retinal folds and axonal damage was discovered.91 The defense expert
testified that, while he could not exclude trauma as the cause of death, the retinal
folds could have resulted instead from hemorrhage and edema.92 Accordingly,
the appellant claimed that the prosecution expert’s testimony was no longer reli-
able and that the conviction was unsafe.93
The court held that this evidence did not make the conviction unsafe.94
While the expert on appeal urged caution in diagnosis, the evidence that retinal
folds are generally associated with trauma and that the prosecution expert had
never seen them in the absence of trauma was sufficient to support the convic-
tion.95 As to the second symptom – axonal damage - the court rejected the chal-
lenge by the defense expert, who had himself modified his own views after he had
learned more about the case and whose experience with the phenomenon was
largely in the past.96
A few interesting facts bear mention: the court commented that the defense
expert, as a pathologist and not a clinician, could not and did not dispute the
expert clinician’s conclusion as to cause.97 In addition, the defense expert – a
pathologist – was from the same specialty as a defense expert consulted at trial
but not called to testify.98 Accordingly, the relative expertise of the experts and
the fact that the defense had not called a pathologist initially was relevant to the
court’s determination of whether the conviction was unsafe. Finally, the court
pointed to the trial court’s correct and detailed directions on how the jury should
evaluate the expert testimony as having ensured that the issue was fairly and ac-
curately presented to the jury.99
In the second case, Butler, the court was not asked to receive fresh evidence
but simply to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.100 The court
quashed the conviction based on evidence that the retinal hemorrhaging support-
ing the trial expert’s diagnosis of shaking had completely resolved itself after the
prosecution experts’ examination and report.101 The court concluded that in light
of that recovery, there could not have been any rational basis on which the jury
89 Id. ¶ 27.
90 Id. ¶ 28.
91 Id. ¶ 39.
92 Id. ¶¶ 29-31.
93 Id. ¶ 11.
94 Id. ¶ 83.
95 Id. ¶ 42.
96 Id. ¶ 63.
97 Id. ¶ 42.
98 Id. ¶ 29.
99 Id. ¶¶ 76-79.
100 Id. ¶ 102.
101 Id. ¶ 104, 110.
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could have rejected an unknown cause. 102 Here, the judge’s relevant misdirec-
tions were noted.103
The third case in Henderson, Butler and Oyediran v. R., the Oyediran case,
relied on fresh evidence that the court considered de bene esse.104 The fresh evi-
dence was from a biomechanical engineer in support of the defense’s contention
that the child had been injured in an earlier fall rather than by shaking.105 The
court noted that this defense had been rejected by the jury on substantial evidence
and that the defense expert on appeal had conceded the uncertainty of determin-
ing causation.106
Another leading and prominent case is R. v. Clark, 107 a homicide prosecu-
tion against a mother for the separate deaths of her two children.108 The defend-
ant claimed at trial that her two children died of sudden infant death syndrome
(SIDS).109 The prosecution’s expert, Professor Sir Roy Meadows, testified that the
statistical probability of one SIDS death in a family was one in 8,543; the statis-
tical probability for two children dying of SIDS in one family, according to Pro-
fessor Meadow, was one in 73 million.110 The jury found the mother guilty.111
After the initial appeal, a hospital record containing one of the infant's blood
tests came to light - a record the prosecution failed to disclose at trial - which
established that the child had died of natural causes.112 The court would have
quashed the conviction on that basis alone.113 However, it took the opportunity
to state that the statistical evidence should not have been received.114 Such evi-
dence was grossly misleading in that it allowed the jury "without consideration
of the rest of the evidence [to] be just about sure that this was a case of murder.”
and "grossly overstate[d] the chance of two sudden deaths within the same family
from unexplained but natural causes.”115 The court held that had the expert's
testimony been the focus on the first appeal, it would have provided a distinct
basis upon which to quash the conviction.116
Another case in which the Court of Appeal received and considered a new
medical report that conflicted with the proof at trial was R. v. Boreman & Ors.117
In that case, the issue at trial had been whether the deceased died from injuries
inflicted by the defendants or by a subsequent fire for which the defendants were
102 Id. ¶ 110.
103 Id. ¶¶ 112-14.
104 Id. ¶ 125.
105 Id. ¶ 179.
106 Id. ¶¶ 183-85.
107 [2003] EWCA Crim 1020.
108 Id. ¶ 1.
109 Id. ¶ 8.
110 Id. ¶ 94-110.
111 Id. ¶ 1.
112 Id. ¶¶ 2,111-132
113 Id. ¶¶ 134-137.
114 Id. ¶ 177.
115 Id. ¶ 178.
116 Id. ¶ 179.
117 [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2265.
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not responsible.118 At trial, an expert pathologist testified that the deceased's
death resulted from the injuries inflicted by the defendants.119 On referral from
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC),120 the court received a new fo-
rensic report to the contrary. 121 In addition, the expert's reputation had been
discredited in other cases.122 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal quashed the con-
viction because it found that the expert's testimony may have "tipped the bal-
ance" in favor of conviction.123
ii. Corroboration of Sexual Abuse
The court has addressed issues concerning medical proof in several cases
involving convictions for sex crimes.124 In those cases, the allegation of abuse
frequently rests entirely on the complainant and is denied by the defendant.125
Medical evidence that is claimed to support the complainant’s allegations be-
comes extremely important and the issue is whether such proof does or does not
help to establish that the abuse occurred. Two such cases are R. v. S & Ors.126
and R v. Colin John C.127
In R. v. S & Ors., the court addressed four joined cases involving convictions
of child sexual abuse under then-current diagnostic criteria, which were different
from the diagnostic criteria that existed at the time of trial.128 The court relied on
current standards contained in “An Evidence Based Review of the literature on
Physical Signs of Child Sexual Abuse,” which was published in 2008 by the Royal
College of Paediatrics and Child Health.129 The Crown did not oppose the receipt
of this fresh evidence and offered fresh evidence of its own.130
In R. v. B, the first case of the group of four, the defendant was charged
with indecency with a child and appealed his conviction on the basis of fresh
evidence. Part of the defendant’s fresh evidence was a retraction of the prosecu-
tion’s trial expert’s findings that the physical examination of the child victim con-
clusively indicated “chronic anal abuse.”131 Under the old standards, that would
have been accurate. However, by the time of the appeal, the physical symptoms
118 Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
119 Id. ¶ 7.
120 The Criminal Cases Review Commission is, of course, the executive, non-departmental public
body whose mandate is to review the applications of convicted defendants and to refer cases to
the court of appeal for review where there is a ”real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding
or sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made.” Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c.
16 section 13(1)(a).
121 Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
122 Id. ¶ 9.
123 Id. ¶¶ 34- 35.
124 See discussion infra.
125 Id.
126 [2012] EWCA (Crim) 1433.
127 [2010] EWCA Crim 1379.
128 [2012] EWCA (Crim) 1433 [¶ 1].
129 Id. ¶ 5.
130 Id. ¶ 8.
131 Id. ¶¶ 12, 16.
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noted would not have been proven “chronic anal abuse,” but only would have
“supported” the diagnosis of “anal penetration.”132 The court found the convic-
tions unsafe, even though other expert witness testimony was presented at trial,
because of the powerful effect of the prosecution’s initial expert testimony. The
prosecution’s initial expert witness provided a graphic description at trial (“I re-
member this child’s bottom but I cannot remember her face.”) and later rescinded
it.133 The court noted how persuasive this evidence would have been on the jury,
but that this evidence was now invalid.134
The second case in the group of four, R. v. C., was a rape and indecent
assault case – a he said/she said credibility contest that turned on whether there
was physical evidence to establish the crime. At trial, the prosecution’s examining
physician testified to and relied on evidence of “attenuation” of the hymen or
“rubbing/tearing away” as evidence of repeated penetration and abuse.135 As in
R v. B, diagnostic standards changed after the conviction: by the time of this
appeal, attenuation could only be used for diagnostic purposes where there was
some record of the condition of the hymen pre-abuse allegation, which was not
available in this case. Moreover, the updated diagnostic protocol described “at-
tenuation” and “rubbing/tearing away” as “not helpful” terms136 and did not
consider the symptoms found by the prosecution’s expert to be a possible result
of non-traumatic causes.137 Significantly, the crown conceded that their trial ex-
pert’s testimony was no longer correct.138 The fact that the expert evidence at
trial was the only independent evidence supporting the claim led the conviction
to be quashed.139 Interestingly, unlike the situation in R v. S, the physical exami-
nation of the victim had been recorded, so the experts offering fresh evidence in
the Court of Appeal were able to see the condition themselves.140 This clearly
added credibility to the fresh evidence offered.141
Similarly, as in S above, in R v. Colin John C,142 the court considered an
allegation of anal rape that had been supported at trial by medical evidence con-
cerning, inter alia, the condition of the victim’s anus.143 In its summing up, the
court had characterized this medical evidence as “conclusive” of sexual abuse.
When fresh evidence established, as in S, that the physical findings had subse-
quently been considered by the profession to be non-specific,144 the court received
132 Id. ¶ 18.
133 Id. ¶¶ 13, 28.
134 Id. ¶ 28.
135 Id. ¶ 35. Interestingly, other doctors found that the hymen was normal. It is not clear why
appellant did not challenge this trial proof. Id. ¶ 38.
136 Id. ¶ 38.
137 Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
138 Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
139 Id. ¶ 48.
140 Id. ¶ 35.
141 Id. ¶ 38.
142 [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1379.
143 Id. ¶ 7.
144 Id. ¶ 15.
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the fresh evidence and quashed the conviction.145 It noted that “the complainant
and the appellant were both seemingly honest young people.146 When the court’s
summing up made the medical evidence “for practical purposes decisive,” and
fresh evidence made that “anything but plain,” the convictions were quashed.147
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
The cases the court has heard involving psychological evidence fall into two
categories: (1) psychological evidence involving mental capacity; and (2) psycho-
logical evidence bearing on the reliability of a defendant’s confession or of a wit-
ness’ testimony. In many cases, the nature of the psychological testimony has
been controversial.148
i. Mental Capacity or Loss of Self-Control
The cases involving forensic proof of mental capacity are more straightfor-
ward than the cases involving expert testimony about the reliability of another
person’s statement or testimony. In several of the mental-capacity cases, despite
the defense’s failure to present a diminished capacity defense at trial, the court
has willingly received fresh psychiatric evidence and quashed the conviction.149
For example, Inglis v. R.,150 was one of the last cases to address the issue of
provocation before that defense was abandoned in favor of the “loss of self-con-
trol,” defense.151 In Inglis, the Court of Appeal found the conviction unsafe after
it received fresh psychiatric evidence that the defendant had suffered from bipolar
affective disorder when he killed his wife.152 The main issue presented to the court
was whether the fresh psychiatric evidence could have been presented at trial but
was not.153
Prior to trial, the defense had instructed two forensic psychiatrists.154 One
forensic psychiatrist opined that the defendant was not suffering from any per-
sonality disorder at the time of the killing; the other concluded that evidence of
145 Id. ¶ 23.
146 Id. ¶ 21.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., R. v. Coats, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1472; R. v. JH, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1828,
[2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 10.
149 See, e.g., R. v. Inglis, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2269.
150 [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2269.
151 The provocation defense was replaced by sections 54 and 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009 (the 2009 Act), which created a new partial defene to murder of "loss of control" See also
Attorney General's Reference No 29 of 2014 [2014] EWCA (Crim) 1314.
152 The court ordered a retrial. Id. ¶ 4.
153 R. v. Inglis, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2269.
154 Id. ¶ 6.
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a personality disorder was equivocal.155 As a result, there was no basis for a di-
minished responsibility defense.156 Rather, the defense was provocation.157 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that this was not a case “where a deliberate decision”
was made not to raise the diminished responsibility issue.158 Since there was “no
realistic forensic basis to advance diminished responsibility,” the prosecution
agreed the defendant suffered from bipolar disorder before the crime, at the time
of the crime, and after the crime.159 The prosecution witness, however, contended
he had been in remission at the time of the crime.160 In opposition, the defense
produced the testimony of “one of this country’s leading experts on the disor-
der,”161 who identified specific evidence demonstrating that the defendant had
been in a depressive state at the time of the crime.162 The defense also proffered
evidence from a lay witness who provided a detailed account of the defendant’s
condition at the time of the killing.163 The court found the “fresh evidence is of a
sufficient weight and credibility that a jury should consider it on a retrial.”164
R. v. Coats165 presented the Court of Appeal with a request to receive fresh
expert testimony that the defendant had suffered from Battered Woman’s Syn-
drome when she imported narcotics in suitcases from Jamaica to Heathrow Air-
port in London.166 The defendant alleged that she imported the narcotics under
duress from her lover, Walters, who met her at the airport in London.167 At trial,
the defense had claimed that she did not know anyone was waiting for her at
Heathrow, but she was convicted.168 She did not appeal her conviction and at-
tempted unsuccessfully to get leave to appeal her sentence.169
Sometime later, after Walters was convicted and sentenced to life imprison-
ment for an unrelated murder, a relative consulted the CCRC on her behalf.170
The CCRC consulted an experienced psychiatrist who concluded that the defend-
ant had suffered from Battered Woman’s Syndrome as a result of her relationship
with Walters.171 On appeal, the defendant claimed that her conviction was unsafe
on the basis of this fresh psychological evidence because the evidence supported
a defense of duress.172 The new evidence also allegedly provided a reasonable
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. ¶ 7.
159 Id.
160 Id. ¶ 9.
161 Id. ¶ 10.
162 Id.
163 Id. ¶ 11.
164 Id. ¶ 13.
165 [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1472.
166 Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
167 Id. ¶¶ 2, 9.
168 Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
169 Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.
170 Id. ¶ 8.
171 Id.
172 Id. ¶ 9.
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explanation for the failure to present the defense at trial.173 The court rejected her
claims and did not receive the evidence.174
ii. Reliability of Witnesses
This category consists of cases in which expert testimony is offered to chal-
lenge the reliability of a statement or of testimony by someone other than the
expert, e.g., a witness or a defendant who has allegedly confessed.
For example, in R. v. Evans,175 the court accepted fresh evidence that the
defendant, who had previously been unable to remember anything about the kill-
ing of his wife, remembered post-conviction what had occurred.176 Significantly,
the circumstances as he now was able to remember them would have supported
a defense of provocation.177 The Court of Appeal accepted forensic psychiatric
evidence which proved that, after genuine cases of amnesia, there can be accurate
and complete recovered memory.178 However, the court found that the defend-
ant’s recovered memory was not genuine in the case at bar.179 Accordingly, there
was no support for a defense of provocation.180 As to a claim of diminished re-
sponsibility, the court rejected the evidence offered by psychiatrists that would
have supported a defense of diminished responsibility because that issue had been
carefully examined at least twice before and a contrary conclusion was
reached.181
A similar result was reached in Jackson v. R.182 There, the defendant recalled
post-conviction that he had been the victim of sexual abuse as a student and
adduced fresh psychiatric evidence that he had killed the victim – a pedophile –
based on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).183 The court expressed doubts
about the claimed sexual abuse, but accepted that it had occurred for the pur-
poses of the appeal.184 It also accepted that the psychiatric understanding of PTSD
had developed in the twenty years since the conviction and that the defendant
may have suffered from PTSD at the time of the killing.185 However, the court
held it was “wholly satisfied that the fresh evidence…provides no reason for
doubting the jury’s conclusion that his mental responsibility for this killing was
not substantially impaired.”186
Another aspect of forensic psychological evidence that the court has ad-
dressed involves the ability of a child victim-witness to recall historical child
173 Id.
174 Id. ¶ 62.
175 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2243.
176 Id.
177 Id. ¶ 28.
178 Id. ¶ 57.
179 Id. ¶ 60.
180 Id. ¶ 61.
181 Id. ¶¶ 69-71.
182 [2013] EWCA (Crim) 163.
183 Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
184 Id. ¶ 13.
185 Id. ¶ 18.
186 Id. ¶ 21.
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abuse. In R. v. JH 187 the adult complainant alleged that she had been sexually
abused by the defendant as a three year old. 188 On appeal, the defense produced
expert evidence concerning the unreliability of such an early childhood memory
based on the development of the brain and other cognitive science.189 The prose-
cution conceded that, while this sort of expert testimony had been available at
the time of trial, it certainly was not well known.190 The court admitted the evi-
dence, rejecting the claim that it usurped the jury’s function in determining cred-
ibility.191 However, the court did “sound a note of caution,” about the kind of
expert evidence in the case, stating that “it will only be in the most unusual of
circumstances” that such evidence will be admissible and relevant, i.e., “only in
those rare cases in which the complainant provides a description of very early
events which appears to contain an unrealistic amount of detail.”192
Also, in R. v. Friend,193 the court relied on recent developments in the recog-
nition and understanding of Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) to quash a conviction that was primarily based on the ADHD-afflicted
defendant's confession.194 In R. v. Pinfold,195 the court relied on expert psychiat-
ric evidence to conclude that the main witness against the defendants suffered
from a personality disorder that made his testimony unreliable.196
The court also has received expert psychological evidence on the question
of the reliability of a defendant’s confession. In several cases, the court has re-
viewed the evidence of Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson to assist it with this issue.197 Dr.
Gudjonsson developed a scale for measuring the suggestibility of a subject. Dr.
Gudjonsson’s suggestibility scale is used to determine whether a confession alleg-
edly true and voluntarily given to police was actually a false confession given in
submission to police pressure.198 Dr. Gudjonsson’s suggestibility scale indicates
how likely a subject may be to give in to pressure to conform or to please or
otherwise to submit to authority. Accordingly, Dr. Gudjonsson’s testimony is of-
ten offered by the defense to show that a confession relied on as proof of guilt is
false. 199
187 [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1828, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 10.
188 Id. ¶¶ 7-18.
189 Id. ¶¶ 25-36.
190 Id. ¶ 28.
191 Id. ¶ 26.
192 Id. ¶ 47.
193 [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2661.
194 Id.
195 [2003] EWCA (Crim) 3643.
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., R. v. Brown, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1606; R. v. Miah & Anor., [2011] EWCA (Crim)
945; R. v. Kenyon, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 914; R. v. Mansha, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2051; R. v.
Henry, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1681; R. v. Friend, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2661; R. v. Foster, [2003]
EWCA (Crim) 178; R. v. Fell, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 696; R. v. Pendleton, [2000] EWCA (Crim)
45; R. v. Friend, [1997] EWCA (Crim) 816.
198 See, e.g., R. v. Antar, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2708; R. v. Steel, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1640.
199 See cases cited supra note 197.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
640
D. FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
The court wrote extensively about the standards for presentation, admis-
sion, and sufficiency of fingerprint evidence in R. v. Smith.200 In the same case, it
also described the historical evolution of current standards for fingerprint identi-
fication.201
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of murdering an elderly neighbor os-
tensibly for financial gain.202 The neighbor had been brutally murdered in her
home.203 Fingerprints were found at the premises,204 but when the fingerprints
were initially examined, the prosecution expert, Gore, determined there was “in-
sufficient detail to be able to make a meaningful comparison.”205 Later, Gore
identified these same fingerprints as belonging to the defendant,206 but he had
made no notes or any explanation of either of his findings.207 As was required by
the standards of the time, he testified to his conclusions at trial with the support
of two confirming witnesses.208 A defense expert had been hired to testify at trial,
but the defense expert was not called because her training had been in the United
States rather than in England, and the court determined she would be too vulner-
able.209 Thus, a single confirming defense witness, Bunter, testified that there was
insufficient detail for identification.210
At trial, and on appeal, the issue was whether the print was clear and de-
tailed enough to identify it as the defendant’s print.211 The prosecution conceded
that the fresh expert defense evidence, which established the prints could not be
identified as the defendant’s prints because of insufficient similarities, was admis-
sible on appeal.212 Gore met this evidence by claiming, for the first time, that the
lack of clarity resulted from a double touch – the defendant had touched the door
handle twice. 213
The court’s lengthy exegesis on the training of fingerprint experts, the sub-
stance of their testimony, and the manner of its presentation is what is most im-
portant about the decision because these topics go well beyond the facts of the
actual case. First, the court noted with concern the fact that there is no oppor-
tunity to become fully qualified as a fingerprint expert in England and Wales
except by participation in the police force training.214 As a result, there are no
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truly independent experts in fingerprint examination because most experts in fin-
gerprint examination are retired police officers: “The position is in marked con-
trast to other forensic science disciplines.”215 The court’s emphasis on the absence
of independent fingerprint examiner experts suggests that this might be a factor
the court will consider in future fingerprint evidence cases. Second, the court
noted the lack of procedure followed by the fingerprint evidence expert in this
case and called for a procedure in conformity with contemporary forensic science.
The court noted that “[n]o competent forensic scientist…would conduct an ex-
amination without keeping detailed notes of his examination and the reasons for
his conclusion. That universal practice of other forensic scientists was not fol-
lowed by the Nottinghamshire Fingerprint Bureau….The quality of the re-
ports…provided for the trial [do not meet] the vastly improves standards ex-
pected in contemporary forensic science.”216 The court’s consideration of the
technical aspects of fingerprint evidence analysis, such as reporting one’s exami-
nations, suggests that the court is trying to move expert witness testimony into
the modern scientific world.
Moreover, the court was critical of the courtroom proceedings as neither the
presentation to the jury nor that to the Court of Appeal used “modern methods
of presentation.”217 Specifically, no digital images were provided.218 Noting that
“[t]his is one of the very few cases where fingerprint evidence has been challenged
at a trial since 1999, and, as far as we are aware, the first since then to come
before this court on an appeal where this court has had to hear fresh evidence,”219
the court called for action. The forensic science practices in England and Wales
lag behind other forensic science areas.220 Clearly, there is “…a need for the
points that have arisen…to be the subject to wider examination.”221
The court held the conviction unsafe.222 While there was circumstantial evi-
dence pointing to the defendant’s guilt, there were substantial weaknesses in it.223
One weakness was that whoever killed the deceased would have been covered in
blood and no blood was found at the defendant’s house or his car.224 Moreover,
the timing the prosecution put forward for the defendant to have killed the de-
ceased and cleaned himself up was unrealistically short. 225 In addition, the court
recognized that: (1) through no fault of the defendant, his principal fingerprint
expert had not been called; (2) that the expert the defendant was able to call was
not verified by another examiner; (3) the police report did not properly identify
the issues for determination; and (4) the expert evidence was not prepared in a
215 Id. ¶ 61(iv).
216 Id. ¶ 61(v), 61(vii).
217 Id. ¶ 61(iii).
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219 Id. ¶ 61(viii).
220 Id.
221 Id. ¶ 62.
222 Id. ¶ 90.
223 Id. ¶ 87.
224 Id. ¶ 87(ii).
225 Id. ¶ 87(iii).
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
642
way that the jury could have realistically attempted to determine the dispute be-
tween the experts.226
E. DOCUMENT AND COMPUTER ANALYSIS
The question of the admissibility of forensic computer analysis has also
arisen in the Court of Appeal. For example, in computer crimes concerning child
pornography, examination of computer records has been required to establish
whether possession of child pornography was “knowing” and to trace its source.
In a more traditional context, expert evidence has been received to show that
police records have been falsified.
For example, in O’Shea v. R.,227 the defendant was convicted of incitement
to distribute an indecent photograph of a child based on possession of child por-
nography on his computer. The conviction arose out of Operation Ore, a gov-
ernment operation in which several individuals in the United Kingdom were ac-
cused of accessing and downloading child pornography through a United States
website called Landslide.228 When Landslide was shut down, the credit card in-
formation of these individuals was found on the Landslide computer.229 Among
other things, the court was asked to receive fresh expert evidence to support the
defendant’s claims that the post-trial examination of Landslide’s computer rec-
ords showed he had been the victim of identity theft, that the computer records
were “rife with fraud,” and that the subscriptions said to have been taken out by
him were contaminated by fraud.230 According to the defendant, he had never
visited the website, but the webmasters at the site had stolen his credit card details
and identity to benefit from bogus credit card payments.231
Interestingly, the evidence that the court received de bene esse was not
strictly fresh. The expert had been instructed by the defense in 2005, before the
trial, and he had been present at the trial.232 For this reason, the evidence would
only be accepted “in the interests of justice.”233 That is, the evidence would only
be accepted if it truly rendered the conviction unsafe.
Given that heightened standard, the court refused to accept the evidence.234
In part, it did so based on the personal lack of credibility of the expert, who had
been convicted of perjury for misrepresenting his qualifications in another matter
and who falsely denied having signed a document until he was shown his signa-
ture on the document.235 More generally, however, the court held the evidence
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did not afford any ground for allowing the appeal because the claim that the
webmaster had access to appellant’s data was not supported by any evidence.236
The Court of Appeal has received fresh evidence on appeal to establish that
police notes have been altered.237 In most of these cases, police notes were re-
ceived at trial to show that the defendant had confessed and that the confession
had been entirely voluntary.238 Similarly, the court relied on forensic linguistics
evidence to show that the defendant's statements allegedly made as a narrative
were in fact the product of police questioning and manipulation and not a simple,
voluntary narrative.239 Because the jury did not have this evidence to impeach the
police testimony and because the fresh evidence might have affected the verdict,
the court quashed those convictions.240
F. THE OUTLIERS: FACIAL MAPPING, FIBERS, AND VOICE
IDENTIFICATION
One thing fiber, facial mapping, and voice identification procedures have in
common is that there is no statistical basis for a finding of a match as proof of
identity.241 Instead, the conclusion of a match is based solely on the experience
of the examiner. Thus, the first question for the court in these types of cases is
whether such evidence is sufficiently scientific to be admissible. The second ques-
tion is whether the fresh evidence, if it is received, is sufficiently powerful to ren-
der a conviction unsafe. This second question necessarily involves the court in a
very detailed analysis of the qualifications of the opposing experts, their credibil-
ity, the bases for their conclusions, and any corroboration for those conclusions.
i. Fiber Evidence
The probative value of recovered fibers is a controversial subject. A good
example is Hall v. R.,242 a murder prosecution. There, the court received fiber
analysis evidence.243 The prosecution presented evidence by an FSS expert that
fibers found in the defendant’s home and cars matched fibers found on the body
and clothing of the deceased.244 According to the expert, the number of fibers
found was unprecedented and the chance of finding a number of fibers of a par-
ticular color and type at random was extremely small.245 In her opinion there was
“extremely strong scientific evidence” of an association between the fibers and
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the scene and the fibers found at locations associated with the defendant.246 The
defendant did not challenge the expert’s conclusions, but sought to demonstrate
an innocent, secondary transfer of the fibers to his clothing.247 The jury found
him guilty.248
The appellant applied to the CCRC, which contacted a fiber specialist at
Contact Traces Limited.249 The fiber specialist reviewed the work done by the
FSS expert.250 He concluded that a scientific technique – the production and anal-
ysis of a computer algorithm that analyzes the results of microspectrophotome-
try, i.e., the “first derivative of the spectral data” – should have been used and
that application of that technique would have revealed subtle differences in the
samples.251 That technique was not used by the FSS expert.252 The prosecution
conceded that the application of the first derivate was not reasonably available
at the time of trial and that the application would have been relevant and admis-
sible at trial. Accordingly, the prosecution retained two experts to evaluate the
defense expert’s work.253 The prosecution experts also conceded that there were
variations in the samples, but they concluded that these variations did not make
the samples distinguishable.254 In addition, they were of the opinion that the dif-
ferences had been “exacerbated” by the first derivative.255 A third expert, hired
to review the work of both experts, agreed that there were differences, but disa-
greed that they were “sufficient on their own to exclude an association.”256 The
third expert concluded that the scientific evidence “provided ‘moderately strong
support’ for [a finding of association].”257 According to the third expert, the dif-
ferent opinions of the two experts were based on the differences in their ap-
proaches.258
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The court found the evidence offered by all of the new experts capable of
belief. 259 However, based on its own viewing of the raw data and first derivate
data, it accepted the third expert’s conclusion that the first derivative had exac-
erbated differences that were not sufficient to distinguish the two samples.260
Nevertheless, it observed that the evidence before the jury had been much
stronger than would now be given, and that the FSS expert gave “an incomplete
picture of the variety of fibers to be seen in each population.”261 The court held
it was in the interests of justice to receive the fresh evidence even though “the
conventional examination of fibers could have been but was not challenged at
trial.”262 The court concluded that, even though the fiber evidence was incom-
plete and identification of green polyester fibers was wrong, “the scientific sup-
port for the assertion that the appellant was the source of the fibers found at the
crime scene [was] compelling”263 and upheld the conviction as safe.264
ii. Facial Mapping Evidence
Facial mapping is one of those less respected forensic subjects that relies on
an expert’s experience rather than on statistics. A good example of the problems
surrounding such proof is Atkins & Anor. v. R..265 There, the court considered
the admissibility of a facial mapping expert’s opinion that there was a match
source. Id. ¶ 20. Each obtained different microscopic results because of their different approaches.
Id. ¶ 40. Coyle reexamined selected fibers from Mrs. Albert’s body and clothing. Id. ¶ 21. Based
on his visual observations of the fibers, Coyle determined that there were many black flock fibers
that differed in thickness and in their levels of delustrant particles. Id. Coyle then selected
additional fibers for microscopic analysis. Id. Coyle made microscopic comparisons of fibers
located at Boydlands and Snowcroft under white, blue, and UV light conditions. Id. ¶ 23. Under
the white light, Coyle saw subtle differences in the fibers morphology. Id. Under the blue light,
Coyle observed differences in “shading”: the Boydlands fibers exhibited a red tint while the
Snowcroft fibers exhibited a blue tint. Id. In total, Mr. Coyle produced 106 MSP spectra – 78
from Boydlands and 28 from Snowcroft. Id. ¶ 24. Ultimately, the MSP and first derivative spectra
analysis resulted in subtle differences. Id. Accordingly, Coyle concluded that the fibers did not
have a common source. Id. Palmer, on the other hand, examined not only the range of absorbance
values between the fibers, but also the range of variation in absorbance values along the length of
each fiber in each population. Id. ¶ 27. Palmer tested a total of 60 fibers from Boydlands and 30
from Snowcroft. Id. ¶27. Palmer viewed each fiber with and without magnification. Id. ¶ 28. This
examination led Palmer to conclude that, while there was a variation in the color, morphology,
and delustrant concentration in each fiber population, “‘the range and degree of this variation is
congruent between each population.’” Id. Additionally, when Palmer examined the fibers through
MSP, he found the fibers varied in length. Id. ¶ 30. However, Palmer also found that fibers in the
Boydlands population fell within the range of intra-fiber variation as those fibers in the Snowcroft
population. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
259 Id. ¶ 54.
260 Id. ¶ 50.
261 Id. ¶ 53.
262 Id. ¶ 54.
263 Id. ¶ 67.
264 Id.
265 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 8.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
646
between a photograph and the defendant’s face.266 As with fiber analysis, this
forensic method does not rely on a statistical basis for comparison, but is based
simply on that expert’s experience.267 The court upheld the admissibility of the
facial mapping evidence.268 Without receiving such testimony, observed the court,
the jury would have no means of evaluating the raw materials presented to it.269
But the court also emphasized that the jury must be told that the opinion is not
based on statistics.270
The court reached a different conclusion in R v. Bacchus,271 although the
decision had little to do with the scientific basis for facial mapping compari-
sons.272 There, the prosecution had attempted to rely at trial on the comparison
of CCTV footage of a robbery with CCTV footage of other robberies at which,
it was accepted, the defendant had been present.273 Subsequent to the trial, how-
ever, the prosecution concluded that its witness was unreliable and ceased to in-
struct the witness.274 Accordingly, the prosecution conceded the conviction was
no longer safe, and it was quashed.275
iii. Voice Identification Evidence
The court has also addressed the admissibility of voice identification evi-
dence. Again, this evidence is not statistically based, but relies on the experience
and expertise of the comparing expert.
In R. v. O’Doherty,276 the court set forth the requirements for admissibility
of voice identification evidence. In that case, which arose in Northern Ireland,
the defendant had been convicted in 1997 of burglary and causing grievous bod-
ily harm with intent, based, in part, on the identification of his voice as the male
caller to ambulance control.277 At trial, inter alia, an expert testified that it was
“highly probable that the applicant was the male caller to ambulance control.”278
The expert’s conclusion had been based solely on auditory phonetic analysis and
did not include a more detailed acoustic analysis of the tapes.279
On appeal, the court accepted fresh evidence from two new experts who
used both auditory phonetic analysis and quantitative acoustic analysis of the
tapes.280 The trial expert also testified.281 The defense expert compared the voices
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on a 999 tape to the defendant’s voice and concluded that the defendant’s voice
was incompatible with the voice on the tape.282 Fresh evidence from the prosecu-
tion’s expert concluded that it was “rather more likely than not” (on a scale from
0 to -5 and 0 to +5) but not as high as “probable,” that it was the defendant’s
voice.283 As the court explained, “the difference between him and [the defense
expert] was one of interpretation rather than fact. There were no population sta-
tistics against which auditory or acoustic analysis can be tested.”284
The court received the fresh evidence and quashed the conviction.285 In do-
ing so, it held that evidence of voice identification, based on the testimony of a
phonetician who carried out auditory analysis only, would no longer be admissi-
ble.286 The court also held that voice identification would not be admissible ab-
sent auditory analysis and quantitative acoustical analysis.287 Both experts
acknowledged that the necessity of both tests had become, over time, the majority
view among experts.288 According to the court, “Time has moved on.”289 The
court quashed the conviction because it concluded that, in light of that testimony,
it could not conclude that the conviction was safe.
The court did carve out three exceptions to the requirement of both auditory
and acoustic analysis: (1) where the issue is which voices of a known group of
voices spoke which words; (2) where there are rare characteristics that render a
speaker identifiable; or (3) the issue is the accent or dialect of the speaker.290
The court also held that the jury could be allowed to listen to the voice
identification tapes in a case in which they heard the defendant testify, but that
they should be specifically directed concerning the dangers of relying on their
own “untrained ears” and the differences in conditions between the tape they are
listening to and the defendant’s in-court testimony.291
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal has grappled extensively with the role of forensic evi-
dence in the criminal process. It has repeatedly, and in great detail, analyzed the
reliability of many forms of forensic evidence and the impact of forensic evidence
on a criminal jury. At the same time, it has been most willing, at least condition-
ally, to receive fresh evidence on appeal at least for the purpose of evaluating
newly available forensic evidence and accounting for legitimate advances in the
sciences. The Court has given substantial guidance to practitioners seeking to
admit or contest forensic evidence and has made a real attempt to ensure that
forensic evidence that enters the justice system is reliable.
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